Competence management in high-hazard industries is often built around role-based training matrices and development pathways. While these systems demonstrate coverage, they do not always verify whether operators truly understand the task-specific risks that underpin major accident prevention. This raises an important question: are our competence systems genuinely risk-informed?
In their Hazards 27 paper, Using Human Factors risk analyses to develop risk-informed competence standards, Neil Hunter, Jamie Henderson and David Embrey explore how competence standards can be strengthened by grounding them in structured Human Factors (HF) risk analysis. Rather than relying primarily on generic role descriptions, they argue that competence requirements should be derived directly from the analysis of safety-critical tasks linked to Major Accident Hazards (MAH).
The limitations of traditional competence matrices
Across the process industries, competence is often managed through role-based matrices. These list high-level operational activities such as “start up a process”, “handover a system”, or “prepare equipment for maintenance”. They may include sign-off requirements, theory tests, or evidence of repeated task exposure.
While such systems are useful for management and governance purposes, from a Human Factors standpoint, they often lack the insight required to demonstrate reliable capability in controlling for MAHs.
Certifying that someone has performed a task before does not necessarily demonstrate that they:
- Understand why specific steps are safety-critical
- Appreciate how the task links to MAH scenarios
- Recognise the safeguards in place and how those safeguards can fail
- Are able to perform critical steps reliably under real operational pressures
As a result, competence systems can unintentionally focus on exposure and repetition, rather than depth of understanding and risk awareness.
A risk-based framework for competence development
The paper proposes an alternative approach which aligns with the HSE Human Factors Roadmap. In this framework, competence management is the final stage of a structured, risk-based process.
This approach begins with the identification of MAH scenarios and the safety-critical tasks that prevent, control, or mitigate them. Those tasks are then subject to detailed Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA), ensuring that the work is fully understood as how it is performed in reality, rather than as written.
Predictive human error analysis is then applied. This helps the organisation understand the vulnerabilities of the task, including where the task could fail, examples of credible human errors and its consequences, as well as making a judgement on the reliability of the existing safeguards.
Finally, any contextual features that shape task reliability, known as Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs) are identified. These may include time pressure, poor labelling, awkward plant layout, gaps in knowledge, or organisational priorities that unintentionally encourage deviation.
Each stage of this process deepens understanding of task reliability. But more importantly, the analysis often helps to reveal gaps in operator knowledge, understanding, or skill that would not typically be visible in a generic training matrix. When an HF review exposes misunderstandings, weak process knowledge, or informal workarounds, it provides evidence that existing competence systems may not be fully supporting effective and efficient MAH control.
Translating HF analysis into practical competence standards
A key contribution of the paper is demonstrating how outputs from HF risk analysis can be translated into structured, task-specific competence standards.
The authors propose structuring competence requirements around three elements:
- Knowledge demonstration – the specific process behaviour, hazard mechanisms, and safeguard functions that an operator must be able to explain and understand.
- Skill demonstration – the physical performance of safety-critical steps that must be observed and verified.
- Core competence – any generic site training assured elsewhere (for example, atmospheric testing or flange management courses) that support safe task completion.
This structure ensures that competence standards directly reflect insights gained from task and human error analysis. Instead of verifying that someone has “done the task”, the assessment verifies that they understand its risk significance and can perform critical steps reliably.
This structured translation of analysis insights into training and competence assurance outputs closely mirrors the principles of Safety Critical Task Analysis (SCTA), where task and human error insights are used to strengthen procedures, safeguards, supervision, and competence in an integrated way.
Capturing tacit knowledge and strengthening MAH control
The HF review process also creates opportunities to capture tacit knowledge held by experienced operators. Tacit knowledge is the insights and awareness held by experienced personnel, but which is rarely documented within procedures, risk assessments and training material.
In an industry facing workforce ageing and generational transition, this structured approach offers a mechanism for capturing and formalising that knowledge before it leaves the organisation.
Competence standards developed in this way are not abstract corporate documents. Instead, they are grounded in real tasks, real vulnerabilities, and real operational insight.
By linking competence standards directly to structured task and human error analysis, organisations can ensure that training is explicitly connected to major hazard control. Competence becomes more than administrative assurance — it becomes an active safety barrier.
Competence as an active safety barrier
Ultimately, the paper reframes competence management. It should not function as an administrative assurance system running parallel to risk assessment. It should be a downstream control, demonstrably linked to MAH scenarios through structured analysis.
When competence standards are derived directly from HF risk analysis:
- Training becomes explicitly risk-informed
- Assessment is linked to critical knowledge and skills required to control MAH
- Tacit knowledge is captured and transferred
- The linkage between risk assessment and workforce capability becomes defensible
Competence stops being a checklist and becomes part of the safety barrier system itself. The shift from role-based training to risk-informed competence is not merely procedural refinement. It is a practical and defensible way to strengthen control of MAH by ensuring that the people at the sharp end truly understand the risks they are managing.
The full Hazards 27 paper sets out the methodology in detail, including a worked case study showing how a task-specific competence standard was developed from human error analysis. You can download the full paper here.
